THE debate over old-growth forests pits preservationists against those depending on this timber for their livelihood. With each side committed to different uses of nature, conflict seems inevitable, for not all good things go together.

This conflict is heightened by public ownership and political control. Special-interest groups are special precisely because they focus on their narrow interests, ignoring other costs and foregone opportunities to use or appreciate the land. If we are to resolve the old-growth conflict, we need to give people incentives to consider the preferences and tastes of others.

Instead of continuing the failed, special-interest-dominated political management of old growth in national forests, consider what would happen if we gave the old growth to various environmental groups, e.g., the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society. This radical proposal would remove the forests from governmental politics and present the new land managers with strong incentives to preserve the values of old growth at the lowest possible cost.

Let's consider such a transfer to be a real possibility.

Transferring ownership of old-growth areas to nonprofit corporations safeguards natural beauty and species diversity while offering opportunities for appropriate economic or recreational use. Unlike rangers and supervisors in the National Forests, private managers can balance these competing goods uninhibited by federal bureaucracies. Nonprofit managers will reap more of the benefits of good policies and bear more of the consequences of bad choices than do federal bureaucrats.

If private owners damage a beautiful area by allowing destructive economic activities they will lose the aesthetic appeal of their land and the potential revenues from donors or recreational users. But if they choose to leave valuable natural resources untouched they must accept the loss of revenue that entails. Smoky's helpers are insulated from both losses.

Many economic and recreational activities have little or no long-term environmental impact. Environmentally sensitive owners can choose these activities and generate revenue even as they regard nature. The Rainey Wildlife Sanctuary illustrates how private management follows these principles to harmonize conflicts among economic and ecological values.

Rainey, a 26,800-acre marsh found near Intracoastal City, La., is owned by the Audubon Society and run for the benefit of the species it protects. What distinguishes Rainey from federal sanctuaries is the harmonious coexistence among wildlife, oil- and gas-drilling operations, and cattle grazing. Why does this work? Private management and sound science insulate managers from political processes that cause mischief on federal lands.

Although oil wells and cattle are not usually associated with wildlife sanctuaries, at Rainey their presence makes sense. Royalties from oil and grazing fees from cattle provide Audubon revenue for operations, land acquisitions or improvements in existing land holdings.

Drilling and grazing complement wildlife habitat on the preserve for two reasons. First, Rainey's managers seek to minimize environmental damage through restrictions on drilling during nesting seasons. Using careful timing, grazing, a notorious threat to wildlife on public lands, is an ecological tool. Second, those who wish to graze or drill have incentives to offer environmental sensitivity as well as high bids. In Rainey we see ecological entrepreneurship in action. Let's foster such innovations in the old growth of the national forests.

Private, nonprofit land ownership avoids widespread subsidies to unprofitable logging, mining, and grazing. It is these subsidies that have created the West's most painful ecological disasters. Private ownership readily adapts to different times and places with innovative management techniques. For example, Rainey uses controlled burning to encourage growth of three-cornered grass that (snow) geese relish - a technique long disfavored on government lands. Finally, private ownership reduces the influence of perverse incentives leading to bureaucratic budgets, political vote buying, and time and money wasted on inconclusive political and legal battles.

A lasting solution to the old-growth dilemma will require more than good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and admonitions for mutual respect. It will require shifting the management of environmental resources from public bureaucrats to private, often nonprofit, decision-makers. Political management inevitably makes policy the captive of special interests and science subject to politics. It gives bureaucracies license to mismanage, waste, and serve their perverse institutional goals.

As a modest experiment, let's transfer 20 percent of the federal old growth to the environmental groups. They are far more likely than bureaucrats and politicians to find ways to make good things like prosperity and environmental quality go together.